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Chapter 12
Regulating Fortress Britain: Migrants, 
Refugees and Asylum Applicants 
in the British Labour Market
Francesca Calò, Simone Baglioni, Tom Montgomery, and Olga Biosca
12.1  Introduction: From a Multicultural Society 
to the Fortress Britain
Any analysis of the legal framework concerning the integration of migrants, refu-
gees and asylum seekers should not be isolated from the socio- economic, political 
and cultural context of a country. The UK has for some time been portrayed as a 
multicultural liberal society with some studies showing that the integration of 
migrants in Britain compares relatively favourably with other countries across vari-
ous measures of social and political integration (Koopmans 2010; Wright and 
Bloemraad 2012). The emphasis from the mid- 1960s until the beginning of the 
2000s has been placed on the ‘multicultural’ society or ‘ethnic pluralism’, with dif-
ferent groups co- existing but retaining their independent cultural identities (although 
placing the blame for racial problems on the minority populations) (Ager and Strang 
2008). However, over recent years (according to some scholars from 2000 onwards – 
see for example Joppke 2004) there has been a significant shift in UK public dis-
courses regarding nationhood, prompted initially by race riots in Northern England,1 
1 For information and details about the race riots and the policy recommendations see Cantle 
Report (2001).
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then by concerns over Muslim extremism fostering terrorist threats and exacerbated 
by the economic crisis and the rise of populist xenophobia alongside anti- migration 
narratives (Ager and Strang 2008; Geddes and Scholten 2016). From being a multi-
cultural liberal society, which has witnessed a steady growth in immigration, the 
more recent policies of the UK Government have cultivated a “hostile environment 
for illegal migrants” (Theresa May speech, 10th October 20132) where nationhood 
and assimilation processes became central to policies and political narratives (at 
least at the national level). To understand why Britain changed from a multicultural 
society to a hostile one, it is important to explore briefly the recent history of 
migration.
During an earlier wave of migration, in 1948, the British Government adopted 
legislation (in the form of the British Nationality Act 1948) ensuring that the UK 
and Colonies received the status of a British subject and was thus entitled to legal, 
social and political rights. Colonial migrant labour was used to feed the post- war 
boom while being employed in the growing industrial and public sectors (Geddes 
and Scholten 2016; Hansen 2003). After 15  years of colonial migration, moves 
towards greater restriction emerged in the political agenda as a result of an increas-
ing tension within civil society, the rise of a more populist Conservative Party and 
the lack of public support for the Labour Party in opposing the introduction of more 
restrictive legislation. Between 1962 and 1970, citizens of Commonwealth coun-
tries that had previously been welcomed as British citizens, became subject to immi-
gration controls and strict regulations were applied in particular to family migration. 
Over time, these changes were reinforced by further legislation through the British 
Nationality Act 1981 that steadily reduced the rights of Commonwealth citizens.3
More recently, from the mid- 1990s up until the present day, large scale net 
migration, the freedom of movement that comes with EU membership (in particular 
the enlargement from 2004 onwards) and the rise of populist and anti- immigration 
movements in the political arena (such as UKIP) fuelling concerns in society about 
immigration were some of the forces that have shaped the contemporary context of 
migration in the UK (Geddes and Scholten 2016). As net migration increased EU 
citizens became an important part of this second wave of migrants. European migra-
tion was also accompanied by an incremental increase of non- EU net migration, 
although non- EU migration had always been based upon stricter and controlling 
policies that incentivised mainly the arrival of high skilled workers, students and 
people from former colonies with an ancestral connection to the UK.
During the 2000s, issues of asylum became a central focus of migration debates 
and the scale of the problem of people being forced to flee their home countries is 
illustrated by the fact that in 2014 there were more refugees globally than any time 
2 Theresa May speech accessible at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/10/
immigration- bill- theresa- may- hostile- environment
3 The British Nationality Act of 1981 abolished the 1948 definition of British citizenship and 
replaced it with three categories: British citizenship, citizenship of British dependent territories 
and British Overseas citizenship. Of these, only British citizenship provides the right to live in the 
UK. From 1981 all foreign nationals have had to apply for naturalisation to become British citizens.
F. Calò et al.
237
since the Second World War (Geddes and Scholten 2016). Strict controls and a hos-
tile environment (as will be fully explored later in this chapter) towards asylum 
applications were implemented by the British Government since the 2000s and asy-
lum applications, as well as the numbers of those in the end granted leave to remain 
consequently remained low in comparison with other countries such as for example 
Germany, Italy and France (Blinder 2017; Eurostat 2018). Policies focused upon 
controlling borders remain in place to the present day and issues relating to migra-
tion have become a permanent fixture of contemporary political campaigns in the 
UK, from parliamentary elections to referenda.
A fourth phase of the UK migration history can be traced from 2015 onwards. 
The election of a new Conservative government with a clear commitment to renego-
tiate the relationship between the UK and the European Union, the rise of populist 
political movements and the austerity measures that followed the economic crisis in 
2008 have, alongside aspects of the campaign to leave the European Union, contrib-
uted to the development of a dominant narrative in UK policymaking that empha-
sises the securing of borders and a more restrictive disposition towards migration 
more generally (Montgomery et al. 2018; Wallace 2018). Against this background, 
tighter restrictions in terms of the rights of Non- EU citizens have been implemented 
in more recent legislation such as the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016, encom-
passing stricter controls in terms of asylum applications, complemented by the opt- -
out from the European Union refugee relocation schemes and part of the Reception 
Conditions Directive.4
This changing context is part of a long- term process where anti- migrant and anti- -
refugee discourses, legislations, and policies have dominated policymaking and the 
media. For example, anti- migration narratives were placed at the centre of Leave 
campaign in the 2016 EU referendum (Cummings 2017) and they have also been 
one of the most frequent arguments advanced by the Conservative party in modern 
elections (see the Conservative Manifesto 2010 and 20155 as well as the 2005 cam-
paign led by Michael Howard). Policies and legislation prioritising the control of 
immigration instead of integration have been favoured, espousing narratives about 
the negative effect of migration on public services and on the reduction of wages:
In the last decade or so, we have seen record levels of long- term net migration in the UK, 
and that sheer volume has given rise to public concern about pressure on public services 
[…] as well as placing downward pressure on wages for people on the lowest incomes. The 
public must have confidence in our ability to control migration. (Department for Exiting the 
European Union 2017)
Fresh legislation such as the Immigration Act 2014 and 2016, the opt- out from the 
EU relocation scheme of Syrian refugees and the recent cases involving the deporta-
tion of citizens who were part of the Windrush generation6 are some of the examples 
4 https://ec.europa.eu/home- affairs/what- we- do/policies/asylum/reception- conditions_en
5 Parties policy positions and party policies manifesto are available at: https://manifesto- 
project.wzb.eu/
6 The Windrush generation refers to immigrants who were invited to the UK between 1948 and 
1971 from Caribbean countries. In 2018, these immigrants who had arrived as children on their 
parents’ passports and they never formally became British citizens have been denied services, lost 
their jobs and faced deportations, raising what it has been called the Windrush generation scandal.
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of the environment that has been created in recent years. The negative frame of the 
debates about migration has also been reflected and reinforced by the way in which 
the media portrays refugees and migrants. This hostile environment has been mir-
rored by political uncertainty following the results of the 2015 and the recent 2017 
elections. In a landscape of political tumult, marked by reductions in public spend-
ing and cuts to welfare, alongside processes of labour market flexibility, increasing 
levels of inequality have impacted upon the everyday lives of people in the UK, 
making the context for promoting and implementing integration and inclusion even 
more challenging.
12.2  Evolution and Main Stages of Migration 
and Asylum Law
Legislation concerning the integration of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers 
into the labour market has always been intertwined with legislation concerning the 
accessibility of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers to enter the country. In post- -
war Britain a key piece of legislation relating to migration was developed in 1948 
and it constitutes a milestone in migration law. The 1948 British Nationality Act 
formally gave all subjects of the Crown including British colonies the right to settle 
in Britain. Citizens from colonies and the Commonwealth countries were enabled to 
cement their status as British citizens and access the same formal legal, social and 
political rights as other subjects of the Crown. This relatively open migration regime 
lasted until 1962, when consequent to an increasing number of race riots and the rise 
of right- wing populism, the ruling Conservative Party introduced a new Act (the 
Commonwealth Immigration Act), restricting the flow of immigration (Geddes and 
Scholten 2016). The Act distinguished between citizens of the UK and its colonies 
and citizens of independent Commonwealth countries. The latter became subject to 
immigration and employment control through the establishment of work vouchers 
(a type of visa) which reduced the overall numbers of migrants. In addition, only a 
few of these vouchers were granted to women, setting a precedent (that is still evi-
dent today) of preventing women to enjoy the right to family reunification. In 1968 
a second Commonwealth Immigration Bill was introduced, again diminishing the 
rights of people to enter the UK, particularly those British citizens of Indian descent 
facing persecution in Kenya and Uganda. New immigration controls based upon the 
‘patriality’ rule were then established. This restrictive legislative framework reached 
its peak in 1971, with the Immigration Act (1971) which distinguished between citi-
zens of the UK and its colonies that had the right to indefinitely being settled in the 
UK (patrial rule) and those who instead had to apply for work permits to be granted, 
(definite) right to remain. More modifications regarding the categories of citizens 
were established in the British Nationality Act (1981). Three typologies of citizens 
were defined by this legislation, implying the prioritisation of the “white common-
wealth”: British citizens, British dependent territories citizens and British overseas 
citizens. New implications for the colonial citizens were then implemented, amend-
ing the status of post- colonial peoples from citizens to migrants.
F. Calò et al.
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During the 1980s the issue of migration received less attention from policymak-
ers while it returned to the spotlight from the 1990s onwards. When the New Labour 
Government (1997–2001) came to power, a more liberal approach to migration was 
promoted (Hansen 2003; Wright 2017). In 2001, the High Skilled Migrant 
Programme (renamed the Tier 1 visa) was introduced which established the first 
points- based system to regulate access to the country. It allowed people entry in 
relation to factors such as their level of education and earnings, without imposing an 
upper limit on their numbers. Moreover, work permit (later renamed Tier 2 visa) 
regulations were loosened to be more responsive to the needs of employers. A key 
decision of the New Labour period was allowing uncontrolled access to Britain for 
citizens of the ten member states that joined the European Union in 2004. The UK 
was one of only three countries that decided not to impose transitional controls on 
migration from the new EU member states (Wright 2017).
However, in the latter period of the New Labour government, the rhetoric 
reflected a less open disposition towards migration and marked a return to restrictive 
policies and legislation. As part of this shift, a five- tier system for labour migration 
was imposed on Non- EU citizens: Highly skilled migrants (Tier 1), medium skilled 
migrants (Tier 2), Low skilled and temporary employment visa (Tier 3  – never 
opened), students (Tier 4) and youth mobility (Tier 5). These more restrictive poli-
cies would be continued following the election of the Conservative- led Coalition 
Government in 2010. Quotas on the numbers of Non- EU arrivals entering the UK 
(and visas granted to them) were established and a more hostile environment was 
constructed. The exemplification of this “hostile environment” and legislation were 
the 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts. The 2014 Act aimed at facilitating the removal 
of people without leave to remain, overhauling the appeals process (although fol-
lowing R (on the application of Kiarie) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department (Respondent) [2017] UKSC 42 this part of the Act was dis-
missed), limiting the access to services such as the National Health System (NHS) 
and housing to people without the leave to remain and tightening controls on immi-
gration status (Wallace 2018). More restrictive changes were included in the 
Immigration Act 2016, in which penalties (fines and imprisonment) for employers 
who hire irregular migrants and landlords who rent premises to irregular migrants 
were established and everyday necessities such as access to a bank account were 
revoked for irregular migrants.
A parallel but slightly divergent evolution in asylum law can also be distin-
guished. Until the 1990s the UK had no specific asylum legislation. The right to 
claim asylum is based upon international law and governments are obliged to pro-
vide protection to people who meet the criteria for asylum. The UK is a signatory to 
these international laws and has long since integrated them into UK legislation. 
Three pieces of international law can be used to support an asylum application in 
the UK: the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees, the 1950 
European Convention on Human rights (ECHR) and the European Union Asylum 
Qualification Directive (2003/9/EC) which lays down minimum standards for the 
reception of asylum seekers. Excluding the integration of these laws, in the UK, 
from the 1990s onwards policies and legislation were implemented aiming at 
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curbing the numbers of asylum seekers and at making life more difficult for those 
who arrived. While a more open although “managed” migration was promoted 
between 1997 and 2005 (as described above), measures concerning asylum were 
mainly aimed at reducing the number of applicants (Mayblin 2016). Measures per-
tained to three different areas: increasing the control of external borders, the reduc-
tion of welfare entitlements and denying access to labour markets and speeding up 
the legal process (Geddes and Scholten 2016). The presumption that underpinned 
this legislation (enacted both by Labour and Conservative Governments) was that 
many asylum seekers were not genuine (and were instead “bogus”) and thus were 
undeserving of welfare state support or should not be allowed access to labour mar-
kets at least until they were verified as “genuine” (Geddes 2003).
Although the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act of 1993 integrated the 
United Nations Convention 1951 definition of asylum claims, it also constituted the 
first act that reduced the benefit entitlements of asylum applicants, introduced 
tighter controls on the application process and involved the detention of asylum 
seekers. The Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996 extended penalties associated 
with being an irregular migrant and removed access to welfare benefits for “in- -
country” applicants as opposed to applying at the port of entry and, in 1999, support 
for asylum seekers (£35 per week using mainly vouchers) was implemented. A no- -
choice dispersal system across the UK for destitute asylum applicants was enacted 
to lessen the burden on the London and South East regions. Through the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 an asylum architecture was created to regu-
late induction, accommodation and removals including the National Asylum 
Support Service (NASS) (now the UK Visas and Immigration  – UKVI) which 
assumed responsibility for arrivals, housing and economic support provision (Meer 
et al. 2018). In 2002, the right to access labour markets for asylum applicants was 
also removed and to this day it is extremely difficult for asylum seekers to be inte-
grated into the job market (Mayblin 2016). Furthermore, the indefinite leave to 
remain (the right to stay in the country indefinitely) for refugees was modified into 
a 5- years leave to remain status with a reassessment of the situation in the country 
of origin taking place at the end of that period (Bloch 2008). After 2010, the 
Conservative- led Governments maintained an emphasis on restricting asylum. The 
focus on speeding up the asylum process and the consequent lack of appropriate 
time to seek and obtain legal assistance led the British High Court to find the fast- -
track system unlawful because of an unacceptable risk of unfairness for asylum 
seekers who have lived through specific trauma. In another example of ever restric-
tive access, the UK Government also opted out of the EU relocation schemes for 
Syrian refugees in order to reduce the number of people that the UK would receive 
(Geddes and Scholten 2016). This brief overview of the main stages of migration 
and asylum law reveals that UK Governments from the 1990s onwards aimed first 
at “managing” migration and afterwards focused upon “controlling” migration, 
imposing a mix of increased border control and reduced internal rights which have 
contributed to the emergence of the legislative and institutional frameworks of today.
To understand the complex rules that regulate contemporary immigration to the 
UK, it is useful to provide a brief overview of the right to enter and to have leave to 
F. Calò et al.
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remain in the country for each category of migrants (Non- EU migrants, asylum 
seekers and refugees that are part of relocation schemes). Each of these categories 
of migrants must adhere to different regulations and procedures.
12.2.1  Non-EU Arrivals
Non- EU migrants have the right to enter the country (for a period longer than 
6 months) if they have a valid entry clearance based upon a visa. A visa has to be 
released in the country of origin and this can be issued under different schemes 
which will be fully discussed later in this chapter. The visa can eventually be 
renewed in the UK based upon valid documentation. After spending a specific con-
tinuous period lawfully in the country (from 5 to 10  years depending on the 
schemes), providing specific documentation, undertaking language and culture tests 
and presenting specific characteristics (such as not being an illegal entrant), Non- EU 
migrants can apply for the indefinite leave to remain. Afterwards, they are eligible 
to apply for British citizenship.
12.2.2  Asylum Seekers and Refugees Status
Very different regulations are applied to asylum seekers in the UK. For someone to 
claim asylum in the UK, they are required to present themselves to the offices of the 
UK Border Agency immediately upon their arrival into the country (claiming UK 
asylum from outside the UK is not legally possible). A person may apply for asylum 
in relation to the 1951 Convention through fear of persecution in their own country 
or may instead make a “human rights claim” under the 1950 ECHR, indeed an asy-
lum seeker may make a human rights claim as part of a refugee claim. In terms of 
human rights, an asylum seeker may make a claim in accordance with Article 3 of 
the ECHR which protects individuals from torture, inhumane and degrading treat-
ment or in accordance with Article 8 of the ECHR which protects the person’s right 
to a personal and family life. Following a pivotal court case (Regina (Razgar) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department 2004) those seeking asylum according 
to their right to a personal and family life have their claims heard in relation to the 
“Razgar Test” which aims to balance the rights of the person seeking asylum with 
the right of the state to effectively control its borders. The Razgar test includes a 
five- stage test comprehensive of the following issues:
 1. Does the [refusal] amount to an interference by a public authority with the exer-
cise of the applicant’s right to respect for his private or (as the case may be) fam-
ily life?
 2. If so, will such interference have consequences of such gravity as potentially to 
engage the operation of article 8?
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 3. If so, is such interference in accordance with the law?
 4. If so, is such interference necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well- being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others?
 5. If so, is such interference proportionate to the legitimate public end sought to be 
achieved?
Once a person makes a claim for asylum they are required to undergo a “screen-
ing interview” which involves providing basic information including why the per-
son is seeking asylum and their route of travel to the UK (to assess whether the 
persons’ claim for asylum is the responsibility of another country under the Dublin 
regulations7). At the screening interview, a triage process is implemented. According 
to the Asylum operating model (2013), the purpose of ‘triage’ is to identify ‘types’ 
of cases and assess them based on the length of time it is likely to take to decide the 
claim and to finally resolve the case. The triage establishes if the case can be con-
sidered an expedited case or not. Expedited cases cover detained fast- track cases 
and cases where a person will be sent to a European country through which they 
passed en route to the UK to have the case decided there (‘third country cases’). In 
a non- expedited case, three characteristics will determine the type of cases: the 
length of time a claim; the likelihood that the claim will be granted; and, thirdly, if 
refused, the speed at which removal can take place. If asylum applicants are consid-
ered destitute, they are eligible for accommodation inside the UK dispersal scheme 
and a payment of £37.65 per week to cover their essential living needs (ELN).
If an asylum application is accepted, there are two successful forms of asylum, 
one being “refugee status”, the other “humanitarian protection”, in both situations 
the person is awarded limited leave to remain (lasting 5 years), following which 
they can apply for indefinite leave to remain in the UK and consequently British 
citizenship. Once asylum seekers have gained leave to remain, they are obliged to 
leave their accommodation  – if provided inside the dispersal scheme  – within 
28 days and register for administrated welfare support on the same basis as British 
citizens. For those whose applications are refused, some applicants may have the 
opportunity to appeal this decision which involves taking their case through a pro-
cess of tribunal and in those cases where there are challenges as to how the law has 
been applied, to higher courts, including the UK Supreme Court and the European 
Court of Human Rights.
7 An overview of the screening interview is available in the policy guidance “Asylum Screening and 
routing” published by the Home Office in 2018: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/govern-
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/700624/screening- and- routing- v1.0ext.pdf
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12.2.3  Refugees Under Relocation Schemes
Four resettlement schemes fully funded by the UK’s Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) budget were provided by the UK government in the period 2014 
to 2016: the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme (VPRS), the Gateway 
Protection Resettlement programme, the Mandate Scheme and the Vulnerable 
Children Resettlement Scheme from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). 
People who can apply to these schemes are identified by the United Nations and 
brought directly to the UK (Home Office 2017b). The VPRS is a joint scheme 
between the Home Office, the Department for International Development and the 
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government aiming at relocating 
20,000 exclusively Syrian persons by 2020. The UK sets the criteria and then 
UNCHR identifies and submits potential cases (Mulvey 2015). The Home Office 
screens the potential cases and afterwards, a full medical assessment is conducted 
by the International Organisation of Migration (IOM). Full details of cases are sent 
to the local authority and after eligibility to enter the UK has been granted, visas and 
leave to remain for 5 years are issued under humanitarian protection (Home Office 
2017b). At the time of writing, 10,538 people have been involved in the VPRS. A 
similar process has been established in the Gateway Protection Resettlement pro-
gramme co- funded by the European Union, which aims at offering a legal route for 
up to 750 refugees to settle in the UK each year and for the Vulnerable Children 
Resettlement Scheme which aims at supporting vulnerable and refugee children at 
risk and their families. Up to February 2018, 539 people have been resettled with 
the MENA scheme. Finally, the Mandate Scheme is applicable to refugees that have 
been recognised as such by the UNHCR (from applications in their country of ori-
gin or in the country where they were recognised as refugees). Although Mandate 
Scheme refugees have no entitlement to asylum in the UK, the UK Border Agency 
accepts that in determining the asylum claim of a Mandate Scheme refugee the deci-
sion maker must give mandate status due weight and take it into account when 
assessing credibility and determining the risk on return.
12.3  Legislation Concerning Migrants, Refugees and Asylum 
Seekers Integration into Labour Market
The right to work is a restricted privilege to which migrants are granted unequal 
access in relation to citizens and in relation to each other. Some migrants are able to 
obtain visas to work in the UK relatively easily, while for others working is prohib-
ited (Mayblin 2016). The next section will outline the different legal statuses and the 
rights to work in the UK depending on the legal status of migration.
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12.3.1  Non-EU Arrivals
The Non- EU migrants (excepted asylum seekers and refugees) can apply to various 
visas to access the labour market in the UK. Three different visa tiers have been 
established and are currently operating: Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 5. Non- EU migrants 
can apply before arriving to the UK for Tier 1 visas if they are willing to open a 
business activity (with investment of at least £50,000), they represent an exceptional 
talent or promise in the field of science, humanities, engineering, medicine, digital 
technology or the arts (endorsement has to be granted by the Home Office), they 
aim to invest at least £2 million in the UK or if they are graduate entrepreneurs with 
an endorsed idea from the Department of International Trade or from a UK Higher 
Education institution. Until 2015, high skilled migrants achieving a high score in 
the points- based system8 were also entitled to apply to Tier 1. However, the pro-
gramme has since been closed and only extensions are considered. A Tier 2 visa can 
be requested if a non- EU migrant has received a skilled job offer by one of the rec-
ognised and licenced sponsors. Sponsors must offer a salary higher than £30,000 or 
a job that is included in the shortage occupation list.9 The Tier 2 visa also includes 
migrants who are involved in intra- company mobility, are ministers of religion or 
are an elite sportsperson. Non- EU migrants can apply for the Tier 5 visa if they are 
willing to volunteer in a charity, they have been sponsored to work as a sportsperson 
or creative worker, they are aiming to participate in a work exchange programme for 
a short time, they are employed under international law (e.g. working for a foreign 
government) or they are working for a religious order. The Tier 5 visa also offers the 
possibility for young people between 18 and 30 years of age from specific coun-
tries10 to spend a period up to 2 years in the UK (Youth Mobility Scheme).
Although eligibility rules are very different across the different schemes, all non- 
 EU migrants must have a valid clearance for entry under these routes. The majority 
of the visas request a specific endorsement from a public sector organisation (e.g. 
the Home Office) or a sponsorship from a list of licensed companies. When an 
endorsement or the sponsorship is not requested, a high level of skills is necessary, 
an amount of investment is requested (such as for Tier 1) or there are restrictions 
concerning the eligible countries (such as for the Youth Mobility Scheme). These 
regulations clearly increase the barriers to access the UK labour market for non- EU 
migrants. Most non- EU migrants who are subject to immigration control are also 
unable to access “public funds” (such as jobseekers’ allowance or tax credits), 
although they can use public services like the NHS and education. Finally, through 
the Immigration Act 2014 and 2016, an NHS surcharge (Immigration Health 
8 In order to be eligible for a visa in any of the five tiers the applicant must pass a points- based 
assessment. In work visa applications, points are generally awarded according to the applicant’s 
ability, experience and age.
9 The Shortage Occupation List revised in July 2019 is available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/
immigration- rules/immigration- rules- appendix- k- shortage- occupation- list
10 Australia, Canada, Japan, Monaco, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Taiwan.
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Surcharge) to cover the entire period of the visa has been introduced in the immigra-
tion application for all non- EU migrants.
12.3.2  Asylum Seekers
A completely different system and right to work has been established concerning 
asylum seekers. Asylum policy has been identified as institutionally exclusionist, 
given that the restriction of rights demarcates asylum seekers as “other” and unde-
serving (Bakker et al. 2016). According to the Immigration Act of 1999, asylum 
seekers are explicitly excluded from the labour market. Up until 2002, asylum seek-
ers could request permission to work after 5 months of awaiting their application, 
but in 2002 this period was extended to 12 months. Moreover, the pending period 
should not be a consequence of mistakes made by the asylum seeker in the applica-
tion (“fault of the claimant”) (Home Office 2017a). This is in contradiction with the 
Reception Conditions Directive (COM[2011] 320 final) published in 2011 which 
only allows a labour market restriction for 6 months (Bales 2013). However, the UK 
government, as explored in the case law section, rejected the 2011 Reception 
Conditions Directive. After the 12- month period lapses, asylum seekers can only 
apply for jobs specified under Tier 2 of the Shortage Occupation list. The Tier 2 
restriction was justified by the UK Government due to the legislation on labour 
market access for Non- EU migrants (explored above). It is therefore very difficult 
for asylum applicants to comply with the Tier 2 shortage occupation lists and this 
clearly affects their opportunities for integration, and consequently has an impact on 
their health and connectedness (particularly of women) (Mayblin 2016; Mulvey 
2015). In addition, asylum seekers are also precluded from self- employment and 
starting a business according to Immigration Rules part 11B (Reception Conditions 
for Non- EU Asylum Applicants).
Exclusion from employment makes the asylum seekers fully dependent on the 
state for their means of their existence (Bales 2013). In addition, they are also 
immediately excluded from the provision of mainstream benefits (such as for exam-
ple Child Benefit, Disability Living Allowance). Only in those cases where the asy-
lum applicant is considered to be destitute or is likely to become destitute with the 
next 14 days (section 95 of Asylum Act 1999), do they receive support from the 
Home Office. Payments to meet essential living needs (equivalent to £37.75 per 
week) and/or accommodation on a no- choice basis are provided. There is a some-
what different situation for refused asylum seekers: they are generally not entitled 
to any help, and their accommodation and public welfare support is removed. 
However, if they demonstrate that they are taking action to leave the country or they 
can demonstrate that they cannot return to their home due to the situation in their 
country of origin they could receive basic shelter and a lower level of support.
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12.3.3  Refugees
Migrants granted refugee or humanitarian protection statuses (including refugees 
who are resettled as part of the VPRS) are entitled to work without any restrictions 
(both as an employee or self- employed) and thus have the same right to work as 
British citizens. However, the definite leave to remain for 5 years has been identified 
as a barrier to labour- market access due to the uncertainty surrounding the long- -
term future of a refugee in employment (Bloch 2008; Stewart and Mulvey 2014). 
Refugees are eligible for mainstream benefits such as the most recent Universal 
Credit reform.11 However, new refugees could face a period without any income due 
to the specific timeframe of the welfare benefit and the gap with the transition period 
of 28  days (APPG 2017). Newly recognised refugees are able to apply for an 
interest- free integration loan to negotiate this period where there is a risk of destitu-
tion. The Home Office is responsible for accepting the request while the Department 
for Work and Pensions is responsible for the payment and the recovery of the loan. 
Different experiences in terms of welfare entitlement are faced by refugees that are 
part of the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme. They, in fact, receive a pre- -
departure cultural orientation and they are immediately provided with accommoda-
tion, a welcome pack, an allowance and support for health and education services.
Table 12.1 summarises the rights to residence, work and welfare access that the 
different migrants are entitled to.
12.3.4  Constitutional Milestones Case-Law on MRA Access 
to Labour and Labour Markets
Constitutional milestones in case- law on MRA access to labour markets have been 
particularly significant in the field of asylum because of the differences in their right 
to work in comparison with refugees, migrants and citizens (Bales 2013).
Asylum seekers are explicitly excluded from the UK labour market until their 
claim has been pending for 12 months or until they have been granted refugee sta-
tus. This restriction contradicts Article 15 (1) of the amended EU Reception 
Conditions Directive published in June 2011 in which asylum seekers can access 
labour markets after 6 months. The UK Government, in fact, decided to opt out from 
the EU Directive amendment. Moreover, after a 12- month period, asylum seekers 
are limited to applying for jobs specified under Tier 2 of the Shortage Occupation 
List. This decision was introduced in September 2010 following the case of ZO 
(Somalia) and others: (Respondents) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(2010) UKSC 36.12 The Supreme Court decided that restricting employment to 
11 Universal credit is a social security benefit introduced in 2013 to replace six different benefits 
and tax credits.
12 Accessible at: https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc- 2009- 0151- judgment.pdf
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refused asylum seekers, who had made further applications on their claim, was 
against the Reception Conditions Directive. This decision would have allowed asy-
lum seekers access to the UK labour market after 12 months from their application 
or appeals. Therefore, the Coalition Government decided to impose the Tier 2 
restriction Shortage Occupation List as the only employment possibilities available 
to asylum seekers. The list includes only very specific high skilled occupations such 
as for example classical ballet dancers who meet the standard required by interna-
tionally recognised United Kingdom ballet companies, physical scientists, engi-
neers or doctors. It is thus evidently challenging for asylum seekers to access the 
UK labour market once the 12 month period lapses (Mayblin 2016).
According to Section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, asylum seek-
ers are not only excluded from the labour market, but they are also unable to access 
Table 12.1 Rights entitlement for migrants
Definition/status
Right to 
residence Right to work Welfare rights
Asylum seeker: a person 
who has applied for asylum 
and whose application has 





No (curtailed since 
2002). Can apply for 
permission to work 
after 1 year if the 
delay of initial claim 
is not their fault – 
Only Tier 2 shortage 
list
Basic accommodation and 
public welfare support. 
Must be destitute and 
willing to accept no- choice 
dispersal policy
Humanitarian protection: 
a person whose case does 
not fit the refugee criteria 
but who is given permission 
to enter or remain in the UK 
because they need 
protection from harm by 
others
Yes Yes Access to welfare rights on 
the same base of UK 
citizens. They need to wait 
3 years to access financial 
support for universities.
Granted for 
5 years in first 
instance
Refugee: a person who has 
received a positive decision 
on their asylum claim
Yes Yes Access to welfare rights on 





leave to remain 
(since 2005)
Refused asylum seeker: a 
person whose asylum claim 
has been refused
No No Not generally entitled to 
support. Accommodation 
and Public Welfare support 
removed. Basic shelter and 
support may be available 
for some hard cases
Expected to 
return to their 
country of 
origin
Non- EU migrant: a person 
who came to the UK for 
work and study under a visa 
programme
Yes. Granted 
for the time of 
the Visa
Depending on the 
Visa (Tier for work)
Education and NHS (NHS 
Surcharge)
Adapted from Dwyer et al. (2016)
12 Regulating Fortress Britain: Migrants, Refugees and Asylum Applicants…
248
national welfare benefits. They are provided with cash/vouchers support and/or 
accommodation if they are considered destitute. According to Randall (2015) desti-
tution has been defined in two different ways. The Home Office under Section 95 of 
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 defines destitution as lacking access to adequate 
accommodation or the inability to meet essential living needs (ELN). Other research 
instead has defined destitution as lacking shelter, food, heating, lighting, clothing 
and basic toiletries or having an income level so low that it is not possible to access 
minimum material necessities. Until R (Refugee Action) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2014] EWHC 1033 the definition of essential living needs was 
not clear (Bales 2015). Consequent to the decision of the Secretary of State in 2013 
of freezing the income support to asylum seekers (equivalent at that time to £36.62 
per week for a single person), Refugee Action – a charity organisation in England 
and Wales – sought judicial review of the decision. The judge responded that the 
rate was not enough to guarantee an adequate standard of living as stipulated by the 
European Reception Conditions Directive and it did not include items such as 
household goods, nappies and non- prescription medical goods considered to be 
essential (Bales 2015). However, after reconsideration by the Secretary of State, the 
decision was to maintain the same cash support (the rate was increased at the begin-
ning of 2018 from £36.95 to £37.75 according to the Asylum Support Amendment 
Regulations 2018 No.30). Although the judgement of this case is limited to the 
confines of this decision, the restrictions on which the asylum support system is 
built were questioned. The lack of an adequate rate of support for essential living 
needs affects the integration of asylum seekers, often inducing them to live in pov-
erty and can often increase their risk of exposure to forced and irregular employment.
The third case, and the most recent, dealt with what has become known as the 
‘deport first, appeal later’ provision, an amendment to the 2002 Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act, which came into force as part of the Immigration Act 
2014. The power to remove a person from the UK pending his/her deportation 
appeal, where such removal would not be unlawful, was thus established. The provi-
sion specifies that the grounds upon which such power may be exercised is that 
removing the person to the country or territory to which the Home Office proposes 
to remove them would not cause them to face ‘serious irreversible harm.’ In the case 
of R (on the application of Kiarie) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (Respondent) [2017] UKSC 42, the Supreme Court in March 2018 
found this section unlawful. The Court’s principal concerns highlighted the barriers 
for deportees to secure, fund, and instruct legal representatives from abroad, the 
ability to obtain expert evidence where relevant, and, crucially, the ability of the 
individual to give effective oral evidence. Therefore “deport first, appeal later” was 
considered to be a breach of the procedural requirements of Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, that is, the right to an appeal against a decision 
affecting an individual’s right to respect for their private and family life. Thus, asy-
lum seekers as well as refugees and migrants who are awaiting the response of the 
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Home Office concerning their appeals, are allowed to stay in the country whilst their 
appeal is being processed.
12.3.5  Anti-discriminatory Legislation
Another piece of legislation which deals with the integration of migrants, refugees 
and asylum seekers into the labour market concerns anti- discriminatory and anti- -
exploitation laws (explored in the next paragraph). The UK race relations model has 
historically been influenced by managing diversity through racial equality, non- -
discrimination acts and limiting numbers (Scholten et al. 2017). The first attempts 
to deal with the potential for racial conflict and to tackle racial discrimination can 
be traced back to the 1960s and 1970s. Three Race Relations Acts (1965, 1968, 
1976) were enacted, aiming at banning discrimination on the basis of race, colour or 
ethnic origin through legal sanctions. Regulatory agencies were also established to 
promote greater equality of opportunity and access to employment, education and 
public facilities. However, according to several studies, these goals remained 
unfilled (Schuster and Solomos 2004).
Only after the election of the Labour government in 1997, were race relations 
modified, through the 2000 Race Relations (Amendment Act) which enforced on 
public authorities a new duty to promote racial equality. However, officials from the 
Home Office that make decisions on immigration cases were excluded. The persis-
tent underemployment of minority ethnic groups resulted in the formation of the 
Ethnic Minority Employment Task Force in 2003. In 2007 the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission (EHRC) had taken on the responsibilities of the Commission 
for Racial Equality and the 2010 Equality Act superseded the four Race Relations 
Acts, combining everything into a broader framework (Geddes and Scholten 2016). 
The Equality Act 2010 sets out nine protected characteristics which are: age; dis-
ability; gender reassignment; marriage or civil partnership (in employment only); 
pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; and sexual orientation. The 
2010 Act encompasses the protections previously provided by legislation including 
the Equal Pay Act 1970, the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995. Finally, included in the 2010 Act was a “public sector 
equality duty” which harmonised some of the existing duties not to discriminate 
based upon race, disability and gender in public sector organisation. However, criti-
cisms of the Equality Act highlighted that including race alongside other categories 
has watered down the protection of minorities in terms of discrimination in the 
labour market.
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12.3.6  Anti-exploitation Legislation
Irregular migrants and asylum seekers that face a limited access to benefits and a 
restriction to the rights to work are often involved in irregular and informal sectors 
of employment (Dwyer et al. 2016). However, also refugees and regular migrants 
could be exposed to severe exploitative labour because of the high barriers they face 
in finding employment (Dwyer et  al. 2016). Since 1996, it has been possible to 
prosecute UK employers for hiring irregular immigrants. Sanctions were further 
strengthened in 2004 and 2008, up to the arrival of the Immigration Act of 2016 
which again increased penalties. Today, those employers who have “reasonable 
cause to believe” that an employee has no right to work as a consequence of their 
immigration status can face up to 5 years in prison and an unlimited fine. Although 
some of the measures are directed at employers, they are likely to affect workers 
who may become more exploited through employers seeking to manage risks by 
lowering wages and/or increasing working hours (Dwyer et al. 2016). Unauthorised 
workers themselves, who became criminalised for the new offence of “illegal work-
ing” would also face deportation without appeal if they did not have the right to 
remain in the UK. The UK, then, is characterised by a strong degree of state inter-
vention to maintain formal labour markets. This legislation, more than tackling 
informal employment, seems to increase the barriers to access labour markets and 
indirectly affect the conditions of employment. This also confirms that a major 
focus, in fact, has been placed on border enforcement and the reduction of irregular 
migrants instead of improving working conditions. Trade unions and community 
organisations have thus asserted some role in campaigning and promoting better 
working conditions for migrants and ethnic minorities. For example, the Living 
Wage campaign in London is a key case example of unions and community organ-
isations working together to improve working conditions for a mainly migrant 
group of workers.
12.4  Integration in the UK Labour Market: 
Institutional Challenges
The lack of a national strategy for the integration of migrants, refugees and asylum 
seekers is one of the main institutional challenges and barriers that can be identified 
in the UK context (MacIver 2016). Integration has, in fact, remained notably absent 
from policy, at least since 2010 (Meer et al. 2018). Refugees are the only category 
for which the UK Government has introduced an integration strategy in 2000 (Equal 
Citizens) that aimed at supporting refugee access to jobs, benefits, accommodation, 
health, education and language classes (Mulvey 2015). In addition, initial policies 
were aimed at supporting the involvement of third sector organisations in service 
provision (Cheung and Phillimore 2017). A second refugee integration strategy was 
developed in 2005, firstly through the Strategic Upgrade of National Refugee 
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Integration Service (SUNRISE) and then via the Refugee Integration and 
Employment Service (RIES). These two programmes aimed at enabling integration 
through the signposting to mainstream services across key social policy areas. Both 
programmes were operated by the Refugee Councils and local authorities and they 
helped to assist refugees to recognise their own skills and experience, improving 
their ability to access employment services (Bloch 2008). However, after the 
General Election in 2010 and due to the austerity measures that followed, the inte-
gration programmes were closed, placing the responsibility of integration fully in 
the hands of local government and communities (Bales 2013). While a range of 
government departments have been under pressure to reduce their budgets, migrants, 
refugees and particularly asylum seekers were targeted as a relatively easy area for 
austerity measures. Asylum seekers are unable to vote, unable to work and are often 
portrayed negatively in the media (Darling 2016; Sales 2002). Thus, instead of 
focusing on integration policies, the major focus of the UK Government has been on 
increasing barriers at entry, investing in removals and creating an inhospitable and 
difficult environment for all migrants. In recent years the policy emphasis shifted 
from separate and specific immigrant integration policies to the broader social 
inclusion and mobilities priorities (van Breugel and Scholten 2017).
A dark picture comes out also from the potential enablers of integration into 
labour market. The UK Government identifies language learning and education as 
key facilitators of the integration of MRA (Meer et al. 2018). Acquisition of lan-
guage has been identified as central to obtain employment, increase social connect-
edness and achieve positive health and well- being (Bakker et al. 2016). However, 
despite the focus of the UK Government on English- language abilities in its poli-
cies, funds to provide courses have been reduced. Asylum seekers were excluded 
from free access to English courses in England (Mulvey 2015) and restrictions on 
the provision of courses for refugees were also established. According to Court 
(2017), between 2008 and 2015, there was a 50% funding reduction of English as a 
Second or Other Language (ESOL) classes. Increasing waiting lists and a lack of 
provision in the local community were among some of the effects of this funding 
reduction. Although a £10 million funding scheme has been announced in 2016 for 
providing free English classes, these courses are only accessible to Syrian refugees 
who arrived through the VPR Scheme (MacIver 2016). For the other refugees there 
are no specific funding streams except those that are dedicated to any other indi-
viduals who meet the eligibility criteria. As described above, education is one of the 
areas devolved to subnational constituent nations of the UK.  Thus, the level of 
access to education differs across these nations. In Scotland, for example, education 
policies have worked alongside Scottish Government integration approaches to pro-
vide access for both refugees and asylum seekers to education (Meer et al. 2018). 
All children and young people from different backgrounds including asylum seek-
ers and refugees have universal access to compulsory education in Scotland. For 
those over the age of 16, fees for attending college and studying full or part- time 
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course are waived. In addition, ESOL classes are offered to all migrants indepen-
dently from their legal status and programmes to integrate local communities and 
migrants through English language courses have been provided.
Concerning education, the UK exercised its right under Protocol 21 not to opt- in 
to the Qualification Directive (Directive 2011/95/EU). Thus, the UK does not apply 
the Directives with respect to procedures for the recognition of qualifications, in 
particular, the equal treatment between refugees and nationals and access to schemes 
for the assessment and validation of prior learning. The UK has a National 
Recognition Information Centre (NARIC) who is responsible for providing infor-
mation and advice on the skills and qualifications of all migrants and it provides 
international qualifications conversion. Support for university access is fragmented 
and dependent upon the legal status of the migrant. For example, refugees have the 
same access to University as British students (with the same fees as home students) 
and scholarships alongside loans are often offered. Migrants that arrive with the aim 
of studying in the UK have to pay a higher level of fees than home students and do 
not have access to the same levels of financial support (APPG 2017).
Some vocational programmes of work placement and job intermediation initia-
tives have also been implemented. Examples of this are the Phoenix Mentoring 
Project or the Bridges Programmes which arrange short- term placement and men-
toring activities. The Phoenix Mentoring project in Newcastle aims at supporting 
young asylum seekers and refugees between 16 and 25 years old in a process of 
learning and development based upon a one- to- one mentor support programme. The 
Bridges Programmes based in Scotland aims at providing employability support to 
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, investing in further education, short work 
placement programs (not paid placement) and vocational training. However, the risk 
of losing Job Seekers Allowance during the work placement programmes has been 
identified as a disincentive for participation in vocational schemes (MacIver 2016) 
and the entry criteria ascribed by the professional standards required in the UK, the 
difficult process of re- qualifications and examinations have been identified as barri-
ers to access the labour market in these sectors (Piętka- Nykaza 2015). Some train-
ing schemes have been developed to incentivise refugees to be self- employed and 
run their own businesses. The Refugees into Business scheme, for example, sup-
ported applicants in each of the steps necessary to set up a small enterprise. However, 
the lack of a national strategy and policies in terms of educational access and train-
ing, multiplies the risk of creating a fragmented and project- based response to inte-
gration issues, a response that risks being insufficient to address the complex and 
multifaceted path of inclusion.
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Scotland
Migration is one of the policy fields where the divergence between Westminster 
and Holyrood (Scottish Parliament) is evident (Mulvey 2015). Outside of the 
borders issues and the naturalisation process, most policies that could affect 
integration processes, such as health, education, some aspects of welfare and 
housing are devolved. Recently, a narrative of a dynamic two- way integration 
process and engagement was promoted in the New Scots 2014–2017 strategy 
and an integration infrastructure based upon this dynamic two- way process 
was advocated by the Scottish Government (Meer et al. 2018). In fact, the 
recent New Scots Refugee integration 2018–2022 strategy defined clearly the 
integration path detailing the responsibility both on the displaced and the set-
tled population in different fields such as employability, welfare, housing, 
education, health and social connections. A specific Race Equality Framework 
for Scotland was also enacted in 2016 to promote race equality and tackle 
racism and very recently a campaign about the integration of migrants 
(#WeAreScotland) has been launched.
Concerning asylum applicants, the Scottish Government decided to focus 
on integration from the moment asylum seekers arrive in Scotland and not only 
when refugee status has been granted. This means that while rights to work 
and to access mainstream benefits are still restricted for asylum seekers (due to 
the Westminster immigration rules above explored), education, healthcare, and 
free English courses are instead available not only to refugees but also to asy-
lum applicants and rejected asylum seekers. However, for some services the 
jurisdiction remains contentious (Meer et al. 2018), for example, in the hous-
ing sector, while the Home Office is responsible for the dispersal accommoda-
tion, the standards of housing are regulated by the Scottish Government.
Multi- agency networks that include several different stakeholders have been 
established in Scotland and in particular in Glasgow to promote services aimed 
at integrating MRA (Meer et al. 2018). For example, the Holistic Integration 
Service has been provided at regional level through a partnership of non- profit 
organisations and educational organisations and is aimed at supporting people 
that have recently been granted the refugee status, facilitating finding accom-
modation, applying for welfare benefits and accessing the labour market (see 
Strang et al. 2018 for more information). Two specific programmes were also 
promoted at a regional level to support integration into employment: the 
Refugees into Teaching in Scotland programme implemented between 2004 
and 2011 and the New Refugee Doctors Project from 2016, subsequent to the 
UK wide Refugee Doctors scheme. Another initiative, the Bridges programme 
(non profit organisation) was also established from 2002 aiming to connect 
employers and migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, to introduce people to 
the labour market. These are just some of the examples of the programmes 
sustained in Scotland which are useful to highlight the different approach that 
has been endorsed. However, a fragmented approach with diverse initiatives 
and projects promoted by different organisations has been also identified as a 
barrier to long- term integration, with the risking of simply moving people from 
one project to another without a long- term outcome (Meer et al. 2018).
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12.5  Conclusion
Our analysis of the UK context presents a very challenging environment for the 
integration of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. The legislation of previous 
decades has been mainly based on increasing border control and decreasing entitle-
ments to migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. Scarce attention has been placed 
upon strategies of integration and inclusion, based upon the idea (dismissed by sev-
eral studies) that employment will constitute a pull factor in terms of migration and 
that the presence of migrants, in a period of economic crisis, affects the displace-
ment of national workers. The main legislation has emphasised control of borders 
and have systematised a hostile environment towards migration, involving employ-
ers, landlords, banks, universities and even the NHS in controlling the presence of 
irregular migrants. This hostile environment has seen its peak in the Spring of 2018, 
in which the former Home Secretary has been forced to resign after the scandal of 
Windrush generation deportation and admitting to there being targets for the removal 
of irregular migrants.
Wales
Tensions between the levels of governance involved in migration policy can 
be evidenced also in the Welsh case. Although the Welsh government is not 
responsible for UK migration policies, as in the case of Scotland it is respon-
sible for several devolved competencies such as housing, social services, edu-
cation and healthcare. Contrary to Scotland, Wales has not yet developed an 
integration strategy, but it has published a specific approach towards migrants, 
refugees and asylum seekers in several pieces of legislation, such as the Well- -
Being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015, the Social Services and Well- -
Being (Wales) Act 2014, or in policies plans such as the Community Cohesion 
and Refugee and Asylum seeker Delivery plan (Spencer and Sanders 2016). 
The Social Services and Well- Being (Wales) Act established that people who 
do not have leave to remain in the UK are not excluded from the provisions of 
services. In the Community Cohesion Delivery Plan 2016–2017, a specific 
outcome on raising awareness on migration has been promoted, while key 
actions to increase the availability of information for migrants and the com-
munities where they live have been undertaken. The specific plan concerning 
refugees and asylum seekers details collaborative actions in sectors such as 
housing, social care, education and employment. Concerning employment, 
programmes aiming at increasing the skills and opportunities for MRAs have 
been promoted in collaboration with non- profit organisations and educational 
institutions.
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This lack of integration policies in the UK has been highly criticised by the 
UNHCR.  Diversity has been mainly managed through racial equality and non- -
discrimination acts. But this does not seem enough to stimulate a process of integra-
tion and inclusion, which has been defined as a complex multidimensional path that 
affects different policy areas. The cross- cutting nature of policymaking in the field 
of integration has also generated tensions between the national and subnational 
level of government. Scotland and Wales, in fact, have promoted a different narra-
tive and they have promoted integration strategies (Scotland) or specific delivery 
plans (Wales) in their devolved responsibilities, which not only include migrants 
and refugees but also asylum seekers and failed asylum applicants. Although local 
authorities and third sector organisations have a fundamental role in trying to 
address issues of integration, they have been affected by the austerity measures and 
their funds have been depleted in recent years. This alongside a lack of strategic 
coordination has generated a fragmented approach that risks undermining the aim 
of facilitating long- term inclusion.
Migrants, refugees and particularly asylum seekers represent a relatively easy 
target for austerity measures due to the increasingly negative narrative promoted by 
policy- makers and the UK media. Asylum seekers are the main targets of such poli-
cies. The prohibition of working, the lack of access to mainstream benefits and the 
freezing of support implemented in the last 20  years of legislation have deeply 
affected the lives of people that are waiting for their asylum claim to be processed. 
Increasing poverty and health inequalities among migrants with different legal sta-
tuses and between citizens and migrants have been increasing. Some of the rhetoric 
distinguishing between those who are deserving and undeserving in terms of wel-
fare appears to lead us to question if there is now a tangible dividing line between 
the valorisation of high skilled immigrants who invest or work in jobs with occupa-
tional shortages compared to those with low skills or those who seek asylum. This 
division most probably will not improve with the results of the Brexit referendum. 
The risk of opting out from the European directives that have invested in promoting 
an adequate standard of living and the fair reception of migrants and refugees and in 
improving workers’ rights will certainly have an impact on migrants in the UK.
However, rather than conclude that as a consequence of social, cultural and insti-
tutional change, the only future is a hostile environment for migrants, asylum seek-
ers and refugees alongside a lack of integration, we argue that there is space to 
promote positive processes of integration. Through understanding the barriers and 
enablers that could facilitate or hinder inclusion into labour markets, it would hope-
fully be possible to counteract the hostile environment of today. However, the only 
way to test this idea thoroughly is to undertake a more in- depth analysis into what 
constrains or hinders integration processes into employment at macro (policies), 
meso (civil society and social partners) and micro (individuals) levels. This is our 
intention in the future stages of our research agenda.
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